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Preventing Memory Exploits Using Programmable Row Swizzling 
ABSTRACT 
Row hammering is a type of memory exploit where a malicious application repeatedly 
causes transistors in a row of cells within a memory to rapidly turn on and off in particular 
patterns. If a row is hammered enough times, it is possible to change data stored in the adjacent 
rows, leading to malfunctions, shutdowns, or security breaches. This disclosure describes 
techniques that make it much harder for an attacker to find row-hammer patterns that can 
compromise a DRAM. Per the techniques, each DRAM has dedicated, programmable row-
address swizzling (logical-to-physical address mapping) which changes when the machine 
reboots. The per-DRAM swizzling makes row-hammer patterns harder to find, and if found, 
inapplicable when the machine reboots. The per-DRAM swizzle also ensures that a row-hammer 
pattern found on one DRAM on a DIMM fails on the other DRAMs in the DIMM. 
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BACKGROUND 
Dynamic random access memory (DRAM) is organized into rows of capacitors that store 
data and transistors that control access to the data in a row. Row hammering is a type of exploit 
where a malicious application repeatedly causes the transistors in a row to turn on and off rapidly 
by accessing data in particular patterns. Every time a row is accessed, a small amount of charge 
leaks to adjacent rows. If a row is hammered enough times before the adjacent rows are 
refreshed, it is possible to change the charge enough such that the data stored in the adjacent 
rows is corrupted. Such adjacent rows that suffer data corruption are called victim rows.  
By causing memory errors, row-hammer attacks can at least cause program or computer 
malfunctions or shutdowns, leading to a denial of service. Row hammers have also been used to 
escalate the privileges of malicious applications, leading to serious security breaches.  
Row hammering is a well-known issue in DRAM. Row hammering is somewhat 
mitigated by increasing the DRAM refresh rate that restores the charge in DRAM capacitors. By 
doing so, the affected rows restore their original values before the row hammer can repeat 
enough times to corrupt data. Another defense against row-hammer attacks is to swizzle 
(scramble) row addresses such that sequentially numbered logical rows are not physically 
adjacent to each other. Some memory units are also equipped with error-correcting (or detecting) 
codes (ECC) that detect or correct the corruption of small numbers of bits. 
However, in current DRAMs, which use a fixed swizzling scheme (logical-to-physical 
address map), the discovery of row-adjacency by an attacker on a memory part on a single 
machine makes vulnerable all machines that use the same part.  
Furthermore, a certain row-hammer attack, known as TRRespass [1], has been proven to 
bypass the above defenses. The TRRespass attack 
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● hammers enough rows to overwhelm row-hammer tracking mechanisms in the memory 
controller; 
● picks random row addresses to discover which row addresses are physically adjacent, 
overcoming row address swizzling in the DRAM; 
● times memory accesses, e.g., uses time as a sideband memory error detector, allowing 
user-mode code to determine when error-correcting codes in the memory controller 
corrects a memory error (indicating a successful row hammering); and 
● once row-hammering patterns are found, uses these patterns to attack machines with 
similar types of memory controllers and DRAMs.  
On client machines, e.g., smartphones, laptops, etc., whose memories typically do not use ECC, 
the above attack can cause crashes or serious security breaches. On servers, whose memories 
typically have ECC, the above attack can cause a denial of service attack launched from user 
space. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques that make it much harder for an attacker to find row-
hammering patterns. Per the techniques, each DRAM has dedicated, programmable row-address 
swizzling, e.g., logical-to-physical address mapping, which changes when the machine reboots. 
The per-DRAM swizzling makes row-hammer patterns harder to find, and if found, inapplicable 
when the machine reboots. An attacker is forced to rediscover the row-hammer pattern on each 
machine on each boot. The per-DRAM swizzle also ensures that a row-hammer pattern found on 
one DRAM on a dual in-line memory module (DIMM) fails on the other DRAMs in the DIMM, 
ensuring, for example, that DDR4x4 parts can correct row-hammer errors using standard ECC.  
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Fig. 1: Preventing row hammer exploits using programmable row swizzling 
Fig. 1 illustrates preventing row-hammer exploits using programmable row swizzling, per 
the techniques of this disclosure. Memory is organized into rows of capacitors (rows 0 through n) 
that store data. A command and its address signal (108) arriving from the CPU is decoded by an 
interface logic (106) to generate a row address and a column address. The contents of the 
requested memory location are accessed by activating the row (using row decoder 102) and the 
column (using column decoder 104) of the memory location. The contents of the requested 
memory location are sent on the data bus (110).  
A random swizzling generator (112) issues row-swizzling instructions (114) that ensure 
that sequential logical addresses map to random physical rows; in particular, sequential logical 
addresses do not map to adjacent physical rows. As mentioned earlier, the row-swizzler is 
programmable and distinct for each DRAM. For example, physical row 2 and its adjacent 
physical rows 1 and 3 have different logical row addresses on every DRAM in the DIMM. 
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The row swizzling can be changed, or reprogrammed, in various ways. For example, a 
large number of possible row-swizzles, e.g., logical-to-physical address maps, can be pre-stored, 
and a command to select (change) the logical-to-physical address map be issued when the 
memory trains. Alternatively, a built-in random number generator can generate a new row 
swizzling configuration when the DIMM is reset or powered-up.  
Row address swizzling can be implemented in a variety of locations, e.g., the row address 
decoder, the interface logic, or other parts of the DRAM. The row address swizzling can also be 
implemented outside the DRAM, in the memory controller. 
Swizzling command 
When the memory powers upon booting, the memory controller can send a command to 
the DRAM to instantiate a new row-address swizzling configuration for the duration of the boot. 
This enables the BIOS or unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) to ensure that the row 
addresses are swizzled differently every boot while protecting the swizzling information from a 
potential attacker. The swizzling command herein described can be incorporated into DRAM 
standards such as JEDEC. Per DRAM addressing (PDA) can be used to configure each DRAM 
on the DIMM with a distinct row-swizzling configuration. 
Random number generator in the DRAM 
As mentioned earlier, a random number generator in the DRAM can be used to configure 
row swizzling when the DRAM is reset, powered up, or issued a specific command. In contrast 
to the previously described command, which only instructs the DRAM to change its logical-to-
physical address map, the random number based command establishes the logical-to-physical 
address map. 
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Partial row swizzling 
In situations where it is impractical to swizzle all the row addresses, the low order bits of 
the row number can be swizzled such that sequentially numbered logical rows are not physically 
adjacent. Alternatively, the DRAM can skip a row order bit for swizzling using any combination 
of low and high order bits. The effectiveness of row swizzling, e.g., the robustness to row-
hammer attacks, increases with the number of rows that are swizzled, or when many low order 
bits of the row numbers are swizzled. 
Debuggability 
Memory parts that fail are often returned to the vendor to undergo failure analysis. An 
understanding of how row addresses are swizzled can be used to improve the quality of memory. 
The BIOS/UEFI can send the DRAM a command to enable logging of the swizzling 
configuration such that the log can later be used for failure analysis. Knowing how the row 
address command is used to swizzle row addresses, a failure analyst can translate from the row 
address of the memory controller to the physical row address inside the DRAM. 
Runtime re-swizzling 
It is possible to re-swizzle row addresses at runtime, rather than boot time, as follows. 
The CPU copies the contents of the DRAM to scratchpad memory, issues the row-swizzling 
command, and copies the contents back from scratchpad to DRAM. If the DRAM has spare 
rows, the CPU can quiesce the operating system to pause memory accesses, send a command to 
re-swizzle the row addresses, and trigger a state machine inside the DRAM to go through each 
row, copying data from the old row address to the new row address. The memory can be re-
swizzled a bank-at-a-time and in such a case, the scratchpad would need to be at least the size of 
the bank. 
7
Defensive Publications Series, Art. 3824 [2020]
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/3824
Low-memory row-swizzling command at runtime 
It is also possible to re-swizzle memory using less scratchpad memory by re-swizzling 
memory a physical or logical row-at-a-time, in swizzle order. When the swizzling logic receives 
a re-swizzle command, the re-swizzling logic walks through the logical or physical rows, 
swapping the data from the old location to the next location. In this scheme, the swizzling logic 
copies the next row in the order to a scratchpad, moves the previous row to the next row’s 
location, continuing this until all of the rows have been copied to their new locations. This only 
requires a scratchpad that has space for two rows and requires the swizzling pattern that the re-
swizzling logic could walk, such as a pseudo-random pattern from something like a linear 
feedback shift register. The memory can be quiesced while the rows are moved to their new 
location or the re-swizzling logic can allow memory accesses during the re-swizzling by keeping 
track of where it was in the copying sequence and making sure accesses to memory happen in 
the old row location for rows that had not been moved and in the new location for moved rows. 
Scope of row swizzling 
To forestall increases in die space or cost caused by the swizzling logic, the DRAM can 
have row address swizzling logic that is shared by all the banks in the DRAM. Alternatively, if 
die space is not an issue, the row address swizzling logic can be implemented per bank-group or 
per bank. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes techniques that make it much harder for an attacker to find row-
hammer patterns that can compromise a DRAM. Per the techniques, each DRAM has dedicated, 
programmable row-address swizzling, e.g., logical-to-physical address mapping, which changes 
when the machine reboots. The per-DRAM swizzling makes row-hammer patterns harder to 
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find, and if found, inapplicable when the machine reboots. The per-DRAM swizzle also ensures 
that a row-hammer pattern found on one DRAM on a DIMM fails on the other DRAMs in the 
DIMM. 
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